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A B S T R A C T
We study the efficiency of private supply of roads under demand uncertainty and evaluate various regulatory
policies. Due to demand uncertainty, capacity is decided before demand is known but tolls can be adjusted after
demand is known. Policy implications can differ from those under deterministic demand. For instance, for serial
links, the toll in the second-best zero-profit case is no longer equal to the marginal external congestion cost. In
the first-best scenario, the capacity under uncertain demand is higher than that under deterministic demand of
the same expected value, though self-financing still holds in expected terms. Regulation by perfect competitive
auction cannot replicate the second-best zero-profit result and thus leads to a lower welfare, whereas without
uncertainty, various forms of competitive auctions can attain this second-best optimum. For more complex
networks, when private firms add capacity in turn, contrary to the case without demand uncertainty, some forms
of auction perform better than others with demand uncertainty.
1. Introduction
There has been wide and growing interest in the private supply of
roads, in addition to the public supply, as a solution to increasing traffic
congestion. Various public–private partnerships and
Build–Operate–Transfer projects have taken place around the world, for
example in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, China, and the U.S.A. (Fisher and
Babbar (1996)). But even in the E.U., around 30% of motorways are
‘private’ (Verhoef (2008)). Often cited reasons are that governments in
many countries have insufficient public funds to finance new road pro-
jects and private firms may work more efficiently than the public sector.
A disadvantage is that private suppliers have market power and tend to
maximize their profits, resulting in a loss of social welfare compared to
optimal pricing. The trade-offs have been studied by numerous scholars:
starting with a debate between Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) con-
sidering a simple network, to De Vany and Saving (1980) and de Palma
(1992) on competing private toll roads, to de Palma and Lindsey (2000)
on dynamic congestion and private roads, and Wang, Lindsey, and Yang
(2011) on nonlinear pricing on private roads. Researchers have proposed
several regulatory policies to overcome the disadvantages of the private
supply of roads. But they usually overlook a prevailing phenomenon in
road construction: capacity is set when future demand is still uncertain
and can only be estimated, even though tolls can be subsequently ad-
justed according to the realized demand.
Travel flows and demand for road use are difficult to predict and very
uncertain. According to Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, and Buhl (2006), ac-
tual traffic deviates from that forecast during the planning stage by more
than 20% for half of the roads projects investigated. Uncertainty is very
important for private suppliers of roads: construction costs are sunk from
the start, and uncertainty means that there is a large risk of running large
losses and even going bankrupt. Moreover, firms may have to pay large
risk premiums on loans used to finance the road construction (Gòmez-
Ibáñez and Meyer (2011) and Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2001)).
Conversely, the government is less affected by a single road making a
loss. Our analysis can be applied to long-term demand uncertainty due to
unpredictable economic booms and busts over the years, but also to
short-term demand fluctuations, such as predictable peak and non-peak
hours alternating during the day. The core assumption is that capacities
are set first and hard to change, but prices can be set later and are more
adjustable to suit actual demand situations. Most papers on private roads
and BOT projects have not included demand uncertainty, whereas, as we
will show, demand uncertainty certainly affects the outcome of settings
where private firms are free to build new roads and where they are
regulated by a tender auction.
Policy makers and practitioners alike can benefit from a better un-
derstanding of the impact of demand uncertainty on equilibrium tolls,
capacities, profits, and consumer surplus. We make the conventional
assumptions that private firms maximize profit, while the public sector
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maximizes social welfare.1 We study both simple and complex net-
works. The advantage of studying simple networks is to have clear
economic explanations and interpretations, which can form a basis for
rules of thumb in policy making. The economic insights gained from a
small network usually carry over to more complex networks. We also
develop simulation methods to examine larger networks. For simple
networks, we distinguish between parallel links and serial links, and
analytically study various scenarios that are used as benchmarks to
assess the efficiency of private supply. We also examine, in terms of the
impact on social welfare, various competitive auctions to regulate the
market. For more complex networks, we are interested in the devel-
opment of the private supply of road networks over time through
competition. We run simulations to compare the equilibrium outcomes
of free entry versus entry by regulation.
Our study is related to two strands of the literature. The first one
examines the effects of the private supply of roads in a mixed network
without demand uncertainty. Following Mohring and Harwitz (1962),
Yang and Meng (2002) show that if both the toll and the capacity are
set optimally for every link and neutral scale economies prevail, the
Pigouvian toll is optimal and each road is self-financing: the collected
tolls cover the capacity costs. Verhoef (2007) demonstrates that when
there is an untolled substitute road in the network, a road supplier who
prices and invests second-best optimally makes a loss, so a subsidy from
the government is needed to achieve the desired second-best social
welfare level. If such a subsidy is ruled out, Verhoef (2008) derives the
highest social welfare under the condition that the private firm makes
at least zero profit. This is a natural benchmark with which to compare
the efficiency of various alternative ways of regulating the private
supply of roads through competitive auctions or free entry, since
competitive auctions also drive the profits of the winning bid to zero.
The optimal toll in the second-best zero-profit case is again Pigouvian
for both serial and parallel links. In addition, Verhoef (2008), Ubbels
and Verhoef (2008) and Van den Berg (2013) found that among many
possible regulatory schemes, two competitive auctions, namely the
“patronage auction” and the “generalized price auction,” are preferable,
as they make the private firm choose the socially optimal tolls and
capacity under the zero-profit condition. However, when we study
these two auctions in the case with uncertain demand, we find that they
can no longer achieve the social optimum.
The second strand of the literature considers a single road with
demand uncertainty. De Vany and Saving (1977), Kraus (1982),
D'Ouville and McDonald (1990), Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1996)
and Lu and Meng (2017a) all study different forms of demand un-
certainty for a single link, and find that in general a larger investment in
capacity is justified, because the optimal capacity with demand un-
certainty is larger than the optimal capacity for a deterministic demand
with the same expected value. Lindsey and de Palma (2014) prove that
the Mohring Harwitz cost recovery theorem holds also with uncertain
demand. We confirm that the above intuition for a single road also
applies to a public network. Tan and Yang (2012) and discuss flexible
contracts for road franchising under demand uncertainty. Lu and Meng
(2017a) and Lu and Meng (2017b) study build–operate–transfer (BOT)
contracts for a single road and for one operator under demand un-
certainty, where capacity must be set before the uncertain demand
function is known. Just as in our paper, their analytical model allows
uncertainty following any number of demand functions of any shape,
while their numerical models allow only the intercept of the demand
function to be uncertain, while its slope is certain. Feng, Zhang, Zhang,
and Song (2018) only consider an uncertain demand intercept. To date,
however, models with demand uncertainty have not been applied to
examine the private supply of roads in a mixed network.
This paper has two related aims. First, it investigates how un-
certainty affects the private supply of roads in a network where there is
also a public supply of roads. In reality, it is very common that private
roads face competition from public roads, which often have a zero toll.
Second, this paper studies how uncertainty changes the effect of reg-
ulation of private supply via a tender auction for the right to operate the
road. Especially with uncertainty, direct regulation is difficult if only
because the regulator will not know how much traffic there will be and
what the price sensitivity will be that determines the possible market
power mark-ups. The “generalized price auction” is won by the firm
offering the lowest generalized price, which equals travel cost plus tolls
paid. The “patronage auction” is won by the firm offering the highest
usage of the road. Without uncertainty, these two auctions ensure the
second-best zero-profit outcome, so that welfare is maximized under
the constraint that the firm cannot make a loss. They thus fully remove
any market power problems for welfare. With demand uncertainty, this
is no longer true.
In other words, demand uncertainty makes regulating the private
supply of roads more difficult and new forms of auctions need to be
invented. The numerical simulation suggests that, with the help of
competition, entry by regulation still works better than free entry. But
contrary to the previous literature, the “generalized price auction”
generates a higher expected welfare than the “patronage auction” for
the parameter ranges considered. In addition, our study offers several
new insights into the unregulated private supply of roads. For instance,
when there exists a free complementary road and the road provider
needs at least zero profit, contrary to the case without demand un-
certainty, the toll is no longer equal to the marginal external congestion
cost.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the analytical
model for simple networks. Section 3 presents the simulation results for
more complex networks. Section 4 concludes.
2. Analytical model
In this section, we study small networks with either serial links or
parallel links. This means that we consider the purest types of link in-
teractions (i.e. complementarity versus substitutability), and thus can
identify the mechanisms that will occur in real life networks in the
cleanest possible way. This provides us with economic intuition that
carries over to larger and more realistic networks.
We aim to model demand uncertainty in a general way. To that end,
let I denote the set of all possible demand states and i denote one
particular state, so i I . Let pi denote the probability of state i with
=p 1i i , N i the total traffic flow in that state, and D N( )i i the inverse
demand in that state. By using D N( )i i , we can represent a variety of
demand functions. Different demand states could have different func-
tional forms and they could also have different parameters for the same
form. After capacity is set and the demand state is realized, the firms are
assumed to know the demand function of that state. This seems cer-
tainly realistic for long-term uncertainty, where firms have many years
to do market research after starting to build their road. To keep things
tractable, our model ignores the possibility of bankruptcy. It also ig-
nores that uncertainty may raise the risk premium that firms or gov-
ernments pay on loans used to finance new roads.
Our other assumptions are akin to those in standard models without
uncertainty. There is a single market with one origin and one destina-
tion. Users are homogeneous, and risk neutral. For ease of presentation,
we assume that all roads have the same travel cost function, which is
denoted by c N K( , )ji j for state i and link j. We assume it increases with
the flow, decreases with capacity, and is homogeneous of degree zero in










and =c N K c N K( , ) ( , )ji j ji j for any θ. We assume that the marginal
1 The reality is evidently more complex. Private firms may be restricted by several
regulatory requirements or societal concerns. The public sector may care too much about
revenue to the detriment of consumers or also care about pollution, fairness, or local
economic development.
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capacity cost, denoted by γ, is constant, to represent neutral scale
economies in road construction. The toll for demand state i on link j is
denoted by ji.
We discuss four regimes, which are natural benchmarks for evalu-
ating the efficiency of alternative ways of organizing the private supply
of roads. In the first-best case, the social planner maximizes the ex-
pected social welfare by setting the capacity and tolls of both links. This
is the benchmark and the efficiency gain of any realistic policy can be
evaluated against that of the first-best case. In the second-best case, the
social planner faces a constraint that there is an unpriced link in the
network, and optimizes over the capacity and toll of the other link. This
will typically result in lower social welfare. In the second-best zero-
profit case, the social planner faces an additional constraint: the pro-
vider earns a zero profit on the tolled link. This gives an upper limit for
the achievable social welfare under private operations. Private firms
will not operate under a loss, and competition will drive profits to zero.
Finally, we study two competitive auctions as useful regulatory tools,
which can generate the second-best zero-profit result in the determi-
nistic case (Verhoef (2007)). In a patronage auction, the concession is
awarded to the firm that will generate the highest expected level of use
of the new road, while in a generalized price auction, the concession is
granted to the firm that will offer the lowest expected generalized price,
which is the sum of toll and time costs. We will discuss in the remainder
of the section the equilibria of the four regimes for both serial and
parallel networks.
2.1. Serial links
We first study a network of two serial links, where a traveler must
use both links to get from the origin to the destination. These two serial
links are thus perfect complements. The total traffic flow equals the
traffic flow on each link, i.e. = =N N Ni i i0 1. For the first-best and
second-best cases, we present analytical expressions for the equilibrium
tolls. For the other regimes, we discuss the properties of the tolls.
2.1.1. First-best for serial links
In the first-best case, the social planner maximizes the expected
social welfare, which is the sum of the expected total consumer benefit
minus the expected congestion cost and capacity cost. The choice
variables are the capacities, state-dependent traffic flows, and state-
dependent tolls. In addition, the user equilibrium constraints need to be
satisfied: in any state the generalized price of an active route, i.e. the
sum of user congestion cost and toll, equals the inverse demand in that




p D n dn N c N K c N K K K
c N K c N K D N
max · ( ) ·( ( , ) ( , )) ·( )
·( ( , ) ( , ) ( ))
K N i
i N i i i i
i
i i i i i i
, , , 0
0 1 0 1
0 1
j i i i
i
(1)
For this and the following Lagrangians, we will skip the first-order
conditions, which are taken w.r.t. the choice variables and the Lagrange
multipliers. All variables, apart from the capacities and the multiplier
for the zero-profit constraint (if relevant), are state-dependent. The
solution is
= +( )N c N K c N K· ( , ) ( , ) .i i N i N i0 1i i (2)
The optimal toll in each state i equals the marginal external con-
gestion cost over the full trip in that state. It follows immediately that
the two links are self-financing in expectation (Mohring and Harwitz
(1962)). As De Vany and Saving (1977), Kraus (1982), D'Ouville and
McDonald (1990), Arnott et al. (1996) and Lu and Meng (2017a) also
show for related modeling settings, the optimal equilibrium capacity is
larger than in the case without uncertainty. In intuitive words: both the
expected toll revenue and the total capacity cost are higher with un-
certainty than without, but they are so by equal amounts. The intuition
is that due to the convexity of the user cost function, the expected value
of the marginal external cost over all states exceeds the marginal ex-
ternal cost for a deterministic traffic flow that is equal to the expected
traffic flows under uncertainty. This raises the expected value of the
toll, but also the optimal capacity of the road.
2.1.2. Second-best for serial links
To compare the private supply of a new road with the overall first-
best case can be less informative when some untolled roads exist, which
is very common in reality. In countries such as France it is even man-
datory that there is an untolled alternative to a tolled motorway. A
better benchmark would then be the case where the social planner can
only set the capacity and tolls of a new road, but leaves the old road free
of charge, as in the following Lagrangian.
+ +
+ + +
p D n dn N c N K c N K K K
c N K c N K D N
max · ( ) ·( ( , ) ( , )) ·( )
·( ( , ) ( , ) ( ))
K N i
i N i i i i
i
i i i i i i
, , , 0






The resulting expected welfare is generally lower than in the overall
first-best case, as the capacity of the free road is suboptimal.
Nevertheless, it is simple to show that the resulting toll in each demand
state equals the marginal external congestion cost of the full trip:
= +( )N c N K c N K· ( , ) ( , ) .i i N i N i0 1i i (4)
The expected toll revenue more than compensate for the capacity
cost of the toll link. In fact, the revenue would cover the cost of sup-
plying both links at the optimal capacity, because with an unpriced
perfectly complementary link, the second-best toll becomes equal to
what would have been the first-best tolls for the two links together.
2.1.3. Second-best zero-profit for serial links
Compared to the second-best case, the second-best zero-profit case
is probably a better benchmark for competing private firms, as with free
entry and competitive auctions, profit will be driven down to zero. It is
also a good benchmark for regulation, as it identifies the most efficient
outcome under the constraint that toll revenue covers capacity cost. In
addition to the user equilibrium constraints, we need to add a zero-
profit constraint.
Proposition 1. (Second-best zero-profit for serial links).
Suppose there are two serial links of which only link 1 is priced and this
link must have a zero expected profit. The second-best zero-profit toll differs
from the marginal external cost of =MEC N c N K·( ( , ))i i N i1 1i as long as
c N K
D c N K
( , )









is not constant across the equilibria of all states.
Remark. The
c N K
D c N K
( , )









is unlikely to be constant, as it contains
the derivatives of cost and demand. It can only be constant in two ex-
ceptional cases: i) when demand and costs are both linear and the un-
certainty only affects the demand intercept, and ii) when demand al-
ways has an infinite price sensitivity (i.e. =D (.) 0
N
i
i in all states).
Proof. In the second-best zero-profit case, a social planner max-
imizes social welfare under the constraint that the profit on link 1 is
zero. The corresponding Lagrangian is the following.
+
+
+ + + +
p D n dn N c N K c N K
K K
c N K c N K D N p N K
max · ( ) ·( ( , ) ( , )) ·
( )
·( ( , ) ( , ) ( )) ·( · · · )
K N i
i N i i i i
i
i i i i i i zp
i
i i i








Here, i for the user equilibrium constraint is state-dependent, but
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zp for the zero-profit constraint is not. After simplification, we show for
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i i i (6)
If the toll were to equal the marginal external cost in every state, i.e.
= N c N K( , )i i N i 1i , the condition could be further simplified to
=zp
c N K
D c N K
( , )









. Only when this fraction is constant across all
states is there a solution for zp. If this implausible condition is not met,
the equilibrium toll must differ from the marginal external cost.
The result in Proposition 1 differs critically from that under certain
demand in Verhoef (2008), where the second-best zero-profit outcome
results in a toll equal to the marginal external cost on the priced link.
With demand uncertainty, the toll in any demand state generally differs
from the marginal external cost on link 1 in that state, unless demand
and cost are always exactly linear and demand uncertainty never affects
the slope of the demand function. This is unlikely to be true in reality.
Indeed, engineering studies typically find highly convex functions, such
as the famous BPR function, which has a flow to the fourth power (e.g.
Small and Verhoef (2007)).
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that in second-best optimum, a
shift of one dollar of revenue between two states should bring as much
benefit in the one state as damage in the other. As a result, contrary to
the deterministic case, the toll cannot equal the marginal external cost.
For example, for a linear inverse demand function =D N d d N( ) ·i i i i0 1




c N K d
c N K

















when >N Nh l, and thus no solution
for zp. In other words, the social welfare is not maximized with the
Pigouvian toll, because it can be increased further by decreasing Nh and
increasing Nl.
2.1.4. Auctions for serial links
So far, we have discussed only the public supply of roads under
various constraints. However, sometimes the private supply of roads
may be preferable to the public supply: for instance, due to the lack of
public funds, higher efficiency in the private sector, or just because
roads are not a public good. There is however the problem that private
roads will tend to have market power. This could be solved by direct
regulation, but this might be difficult due to a lack of information for
the regulator. This is especially relevant if demand or costs are un-
certain. Then a competitive auction on expected use (patronage) or
expected generalized price is interesting, as then the competition in the
auction drives the outcome towards the second-best zero-profit out-
come. Nevertheless, as we will see, auctions do not lead to exactly the
same outcome as in the second-best zero-profit case, differing in this
regard from the deterministic setting.
We assume a perfectly competitive auction, all bidding firms have
the same marginal capacity cost γ and full information of the congestion
cost function, and they will bid until the expected profit is exhausted. In
the deterministic case, Verhoef (2008) showed that two auctions can
implement the second-best zero-profit outcome. These are the pa-
tronage auction, where firms bid in terms of committing to achieve the
highest traffic flow on the toll road and the generalized price auction,
where they bid to realize the lowest generalized price. So we will now
study how these two auctions perform under uncertain demand. In
reality, auctions will tend to have imperfect competition: the number of
bidders is limited as only a few firms (operating in a country or regions)
have the expertise to build and operate toll roads, and firms may differ
in construction and management costs or have different expectations.
Van den Berg and Rouwendal (2016) find that under deterministic
demand, the outcome of an auction approaches the perfectly competi-
tive case as the auction becomes more competitive (as the bidding firms
become more similar).
Proposition 2. (Patronage auction for serial links).
If road 0 remains unpriced, the equilibrium toll on serial road 1 of a
perfectly competitive patronage auction differs from:
I the equilibrium toll of the second-best zero-profit case, under any
structure of the demand uncertainty.
II the marginal external congestion cost MEC i1 of road 1, unless
N D c N K
1





is constant across the equilibria of all states.
Proof. To maximize expected patronage, under the user equilibrium




p N c N K c N K D N
p N K
max · ·( ( , ) ( , ) ( ))








, , , ,
0 1
1
i i i zp1
(7)
We can again use the Lagrange multiplier for the zero-profit con-
straint: 3
= ( )N D c N K c N K
1









0 1i i i (8)
To show result 2.I., that the tolls from the patronage auction differ
from the second-best zero-profit outcome, we only need to compare the
multipliers in (6) and (8). If the two policies were to lead to the same
toll in each state, the numerators would need to be proportional, since
the denominators are the same. In Eq. (6), the numerator is clearly not
constant over states and so cannot be proportional to the numerator in
(8), which equals 1.
To prove 2.II., that the toll generally differs from
=MEC N c N K· ( , ))i i N i1 1i , we again use the fact that zp must be constant
across states. If the toll were to equal MEC i1, then zp would simplify to
N D c N K
1





, which has to be the same in any state for the mul-
tiplier to be constant across states.
It is very unlikely for the above condition to be met in reality. For
instance, assume that the functional form of the demand is constant
across states; then, for the condition to hold, the demand in all states
must be = +D d c N K d Log N( , ) · ( )i i i i0 0 1 . For this demand function,
the uncertainty can only be in the demand intercept d i0, and the demand
function happens to contain the cost function of link 0 at arbitrary ca-
pacity K0 as well as the term d Log N· ( )i1 . Besides the very arbitrary and
exact nature of this demand set-up, this also means that the demand is
upward sloping in some range unless the cost is linear.
Proposition 3. (Generalized price auction for serial links)
If road 0 remains unpriced, the equilibrium toll on serial road 1 of a
perfectly competitive generalized price auction differs from:
I the equilibrium toll of the second-best zero-profit case, for any demand
uncertainty.
II the equilibrium toll of the patronage auction, unless the slope of the
2 zp reflects how much the expected social welfare changes if we allow a small ex-
pected surplus or deficit. The numerator is the derivative of the social welfare in state i
with respect to the traffic volume in state i. It thus equals the height of the Harberger
triangle that measures the deadweight loss due to inefficient tolling. The denominator is
the derivative of the financial deficit in state i with respect to the traffic volume in state i.
As the traffic volume in state i increases, the social planner gets more toll payments from
the new marginal traveler, but collects less toll from every original traveler.
3 This multiplier reflects how much the expected patronage changes if we allow a small
expected deficit. It has to be the same across states. The numerator equals the derivative
of the traffic volume in a state (directly entering the objective as the patronage) with
respect to itself, and is therefore 1. The denominator is the derivative of the expected
deficit in state i with respect to the traffic volume in that state, which is the same as in (6).
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inverse demand is constant across the equilibria of all states.4
III the marginal external cost MEC i1 of road 1, unless
D
N D c N K
(.)








is constant across states.
Proof. To maximize the expected generalized price, under the user
equilibrium constraint in every state and the zero expected-profit
constraint, the Lagrangian is
+ + +
+
p D N c N K c N K D N
p N K
min · ( ) ( ( , ) ( , ) ( ))








, , , ,
0 1
1
i i i zp1
(9)
The multiplier for the zero expected-profit constraint is
= ( )
D
N D c N K c N K
(.)












i i i (10)
Using the methods used for Proposition 2, it is straightforward to
show that the tolls resulting from the price auction generally differ from
those of 3.I, the second-best zero-profit case, and from 3.III, the mar-
ginal external cost. So we omit a detailed Proof. For result 3.II, we start
with a linear inverse demand function with uncertainty only on the
intercept, where D (.)
N
i
i is a constant and the same in all states. Then the
zero-profit multipliers (7) and (9) for the two auctions are proportional.
Therefore, they can have the same toll rules and both have zero-profit
multipliers that are constant over demand states. The intuition is that,
in this situation, the maximum expected total traffic flow corresponds
to the minimum expected generalized price. For non-linear demands or
more general uncertainty, the outcomes of the auctions will be dif-
ferent, as there is no one-to-one relation between expected flows and
expected generalized price, meaning that both zero-profit multipliers
cannot be constant for the same toll rule.
In sum, the patronage auction and the generalized price auction in
general cannot replicate the result for the second-best zero-profit case
with serial links if there is demand uncertainty, and the two auctions
also generally lead to different outcomes. This differs from certain de-
mand, where both auctions always lead to the second-best zero-profit
outcome. There are two ways to explain this. Firstly, the auctions and
the second best zero-profit case have different expected optimization
objectives. For linear inverse demand functions, in each state, the
consumer surplus is quadratic in the traffic flow while the patronage
and the generalized price are linear in the traffic flow, so the highest
expected consumer surplus corresponds to neither the highest expected
patronage nor the lowest expected generalized price. Secondly, although
the FOCs for K, ,i i1 and zp are the same for the two auctions and the
second-best zero-profit case, they cannot determine an unique solution.
The solution depends also on the FOCs for N i, which differ for different
cases. On the contrary, when there is no demand uncertainty, the three
maximizations are equivalent and the FOCs determine an unique
combination of flows, capacity, and toll (Wu, Yin, and Yang (2011) and
Verhoef (2007)).
2.2. Parallel links
This section considers two parallel links, where both roads connect
the same origin and destination and a traveler can use either of them.
They are pure substitutes, so the total traffic flow is the sum of the
traffic flow of both links, i.e. = +N N Ni i i0 1.
2.2.1. First-best for parallel links
In the first-best case, the Lagrangian is as follows.
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The Pigouvian toll is levied on each link in each state, so the ex-
ternality is internalized and the roads are self-financing in expectation
(De Vany and Saving (1977); Kraus (1982); D'Ouville and McDonald
(1990); Arnott et al. (1996); and Lu and Meng (2017a)).
2.2.2. Second-best for parallel links
In the second-best case, now an untolled parallel link already exists.
When the social planner optimizes the capacity and tolls of the new
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Similar to the case without uncertainty, the toll in each demand
state equals the sum of the marginal external congestion cost and a
negative network spillover effect. The social planner should expect a
loss on the toll road, as the toll is lower than the Pigouvian toll (Verhoef
(2007)).
2.2.3. Second-best zero-profit for parallel links
In the second-best case with parallel links, the operator of the toll
road makes a loss. The logical follow-up question is: what is the highest
expected social welfare if this road has to be self-financing? This is a
natural benchmark for private supply when there is an untolled alter-
native parallel road: we cannot expect the private road to make a loss,
so the best we can hope for is welfare maximization under a zero-profit
constraint.
Proposition 4. (Second-best zero-profit for parallel links).
In contrast to the case with the serial links, with parallel links, the
second-best zero expected-profit toll can be Pigouvian, as it equals the
marginal external cost MEC i1 on link 1 in each demand state i. A necessary
condition is that the cost function be such that for any capacities Kj, the
marginal social cost at any flow Nj equals the travel cost for a flow that is a
factor θ higher: = c N K( · , )N c N KN j k
( · ( , ))j j j
j
.
Remark The condition in Proposition 4 holds for most commonly







Vickrey bottleneck congestion, and an exponential cost of +c c e·
Nj
i
Kj0 1 . It
would not hold for a cost function that has more variability in the
congestion than commonly used in the literature, such as













Proof. Mathematically, we solve the following Lagrangian problem.
4 So, in practice, this means that demand must be exactly linear and that uncertainty can not
affect the demand slope.
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After simplification, the condition for the Lagrange multiplier is 5
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With the Pigouvian toll, i.e. = N c N K· ( , )i i N i1 1 1i1 , the multiplier fur-






. Moreover, in each state, the generalized
price on link 1 will equal the marginal social cost of =MSC i N c N KN1




and on link 0 the price will be simply c N K( , )i0 0 . Given our assumptions






is constant across states.6
If the social planner allows an expected deficit on the tolled road,
the positivity of zp in (15) shows that the expected welfare increases.
The Pigouvian toll on the toll road does not take into account the
congestion spill-over to the untolled road, and hence lowering the toll
below the Pigouvian level would raise welfare. This increase in welfare
is larger when there are more travelers on the untolled road or fewer
travelers on the toll road. In the extreme case of zero traffic flow on the
untolled road, the effect on welfare is zero because we have already
achieved the highest possible welfare.
2.2.4. Auctions for parallel links
Without demand uncertainty, the patronage auction and the gen-
eralized price auction would replicate the second-best zero-profit out-
come also for parallel links (Verhoef, 2007). This subsection shows that
this is not true with demand uncertainty. For policy makers thinking of
how to regulate the private firms, more sophisticated mechanisms are
needed.
Proposition 5. (Patronage auction for parallel links).
Unlike the case without demand uncertainty, when there is uncertain
demand, the perfectly competitive patronage auction generally cannot attain
the second-best zero-profit auction, and hence leads to a lower welfare. A
sufficient condition for this is the condition in Proposition 4.
Proof. For the patronage auction, we set up the Lagrangian that
maximizes the expected flow on the tolled link subject to user equili-
brium constraints and a zero-profit constraint:
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The FOCs for K, ,i ji1 1 and zp are the same as those of the second-
best zero-profit case. However, unlike the case without uncertainty Wu
et al. (2011), these conditions cannot determine an unique solution,
since demand uncertainty brings in more choice variables. The La-
grange multiplier for the zero-profit constraint shows that the toll,
which has no closed-form solution, cannot be the same as in the second-
best zero-profit case7:
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If the toll were to equal the marginal external cost in each state i,
then zp could not be constant, and so this toll rule does not maximize
the Lagrangian that is equivalent to the patronage auction. So, unlike
the case without demand uncertainty, the resulting toll cannot be equal
to the marginal external congestion cost on the toll road.
As this auction leads to a zero profit but a different outcome than
the second-best zero-profit case, it must have a lower welfare, since the
second-best zero-profit case by definition attains the highest welfare
given that road 0 is unpriced and road 1 has to have zero profit.
Now we turn to the perfectly competitive generalized price auction.
It implies that a firm minimizes the expected generalized price under
the limitation that the tolled road breaks even in expected terms, since
the perfect competition in the auction implies that the auction winner
must attain a zero expected pay-off.
Proposition 6. (Generalized price auction for parallel links).
The perfectly competitive generalized price auction with an untolled
parallel alternative leads to a different equilibrium toll than:
I the marginal external cost, unless the flow N i is the same in all demand
states.
II the toll in the second-best zero-profit case. A sufficient condition for this
is the condition in Proposition 4.
III the toll in the patronage auction, unless demand and cost functions are
both linear in traffic flow and uncertainty is only in the intercept of the
demand function.
Proof. The Lagrangian for the problem with parallel links is
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If the toll were to equal the MECi in each state, the zp in (21) would
simplify to N1/ i and this varies if the flow is not the same in all states.
This proves result 6.I. A road use that does not vary with demand
5 The numerator of zp is the derivative of welfare in state i w.r.t. Ni1. It equals the sum
of the heights of the Harberger triangles of both links, where that of the untolled link is
weighted to reflect the substitution in usage of the two links. The denominator is the
derivative of the deficit in state i w.r.t. Ni1. As the tolled flow increases, the road provider
gets toll payments from new tolled users, but can get a lower toll from all original tolled
users, as the general prices on the two links must be the same. If Ni1 marginally increases

















, the resulting flows will satisfy









under a Pigouvian toll on link 1 in any state i.
7 The numerator of zp is the derivative of the traffic volume on the tolled road in state i
with respect to itself, thus its value is 1. The denominator is the same as in (15).
8 The numerator is the derivative of the generalized price in state i with respect to the
tolled flow, taking into consideration the induced traffic volume on the untolled link. The
denominator is the same as in the earlier two cases, (17) and (19).
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uncertainty seems very implausible. Under the sufficient condition for
result 6.II, it would be impossible that (21) were constant at the second-
best zero-profit case that that we know makes (17) constant across
states. For 6.III, the two auction outcomes differ, since the multipliers in
(19) and (21) differ in their numerators, while the denominators are the
same. For the numerator in (21) to be constant over all states, as in (18),
a sufficient condition is that the demand and cost functions are both
linear in the traffic flow and the uncertainty is only in the intercept of
the demand function.
In sum, neither the patronage auction nor the generalized price
auction can in general replicate the result of the second-best zero-profit
case. The traffic volumes that maximize the expected social welfare
under the zero-profit constraint neither maximize the expected pa-
tronage on the toll road nor minimize the expected generalized price.
3. Numerical analysis
The analytical results for the two simple networks show that de-
mand uncertainty is likely to affect the efficiency of the private supply
of roads, in that equilibria with competitive auctions differ from the
second-best zero-profit outcomes. For a more general network, which is
also more realistic, clear-cut analytical results are hard to obtain, and
we rely on numerical simulations to gain further insights. Moreover,
with the help of simulations, not only may we examine statically how
private roads perform in a given mixed network, but can also learn how
to regulate dynamically the private provision of roads through the
formation of networks.
Similar to Verhoef (2008), we assume there are two serial segments
a and b in a network connecting one origin and one destination. The
initial links on the two segments, denoted by a0 and b0, are untolled,
which represent a pre-existing free public road network. Private firms
can add capacity to each segment, one at a time, and then charge tolls.
For example, if the first firm adds a link in section a, we denote the new
link by a1. Road a1 is now parallel to the existing link a0, and serial to
the existing link b0. In this way, we can model both parallel and serial
competition and the development of a network.
The timing of the game is as follows: since construction takes time,
there is, at the beginning of each round, uncertainty about the future
demand. Firms compete to add capacity to one section of the network,
without knowing the demand that will be realized. After the demand
uncertainty is resolved, the firms can no longer change their capacities,
but they can decide on the tolls to charge on their own links. Then there
is again demand uncertainty, and a new round begins. This sequential
game continues until there is no profit for a new entry.
We will discuss the basic benchmarks first, then compare and contrast
two regimes: the unregulated free-entry regime and the regulated entry-by-
auction regime. In the free-entry regime, the firm with the highest expected
profit adds capacity to the most desired section. After the capacity is built,
the demand is known, and all firms in the network play a Bertrand price
setting game, i.e. every firm sets its own toll simultaneously while taking the
tolls of the other road operators as given. In the entry-by-auction regime, the
winner of an auction can add capacity. Due to the perfect competition in the
auctions, any firm that adds capacity earns zero profit in expectation. The
auction can be on either the expected patronage of the new road, or the
expected generalized price. To be comparable to the deterministic case in
Verhoef (2008), when demand is known, all existing firms charge tolls as
promised in the auction and stick to these over successive rounds, so there is
no direct toll competition in the entry-by-auction regime.
The parameters of the numerical simulation are as follows.9 To be
comparable with Verhoef (2008), the inverse demand function is linear
and =D N N( ) ·i i i i0 1 . The demand uncertainty is in the intercept,
which is h0 with probability ph and l0 with probability p1 h. We set
= = = =p0.01167, 74.11, 49.41, 0.5h l h1 0 0 , which means that com-
pared to the expected level, the reservation price can go up or down by
20% with equal probability. According to Flyvbjerg et al. (2006), actual
traffic deviates from the forecasted traffic by more than 20% for half of
the road projects. The congestion cost function is of the BPR form






. The value of time, α, is set at 7.5. tf is
the free-flow travel time and is set at 0.25, implying a total trip length
of 60 km for a highway with a speed of 120 km/hour. β and χ take their
conventional values of 0.15 and 4, respectively. The marginal capacity
cost is 3.5 for both segments, and represents the hourly capital cost per
unit of capacity. We assume initial capacities of .
3.1. Benchmark
As a benchmark, Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the base,
first-best, second-best, and second-best zero-profit cases. The results of
interest are: the social welfare (S), relative efficiency (ω) 10, profit (π),
Table 1
Benchmark equilibria.
Variables Base First-best Second-best Second-best zero-profit
E S[ ] 60189 113741 112193 103241
ω 0 1 0.971 0.804
E E[ ], [ ]a b0 0 −5250 0 −5250 −5250
E E[ ], [ ]a b1 1 – – −8043 0
K K,a b0 0 1500 3644 1500 1500
K K,a b1 1 – – 2479 1401
,ah bh0 0 0 4.226 0 0
,ah bh1 1 – – 0.350 4.226
,al bl0 0 0 1.119 0 0
,al bl1 1 – – 0.022 1.119
c c,ah bh0 0 14.230 2.931 3.313 7.157
c c,ah bh1 1 – – 2.963 2.931
c c,al bl0 0 6.697 2.155 2.131 3.273
c c,al bl1 1 – – 2.110 2.155
Ph 28.459 14.315 6.626 14.315
Pl 13.395 6.546 4.263 6.546
9 The assumption of a linear demand function and two-state demand uncertainty is for
simplicity of simulation and the results does not change qualitatively when varying these
assumptions. We have discussed general forms of demand function and uncertainty dis-
tribution in the theoretical section.
10 The relative efficiency is the gain in the expected social welfare in the regime, di-
vided by the gain achieved when moving from the base equilibrium to the first-best
outcome.
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capacity (K), toll (τ), congestion cost (c), and generalized price (P). The
superscript h denotes the high demand state, and l the low one. The
subscript a (b) is for section a (b), while 0 (1) is for the initial (newly-
added) link. E is for expectation. The results are fully consistent with
the analytical model.
The base equilibrium with the two untolled links is quite congested,
and its expected social welfare is only half the first-best value. Since no
toll is charged, there is a loss on the two initial links. In the first-best
case, the capacity more than doubles from the base case and the con-
gestion cost in both states decreases. The expected profit is zero, be-
cause the profit in the high state and the loss in the low state cancel out.
Compared with the deterministic case discussed in Verhoef (2008), the
first-best capacity is larger under uncertainty, as was also found in Lu
and Meng (2017a).
The second-best case achieves 97.1% of the increase in the expected
welfare from the base equilibrium to the first-best case. However, this
generates a considerable loss for the two newly-added parallel links in
both demand states, because the capacity expansion is too large for the
toll revenue to cover. As predicted by our theory for the parallel links,
the second-best zero-profit case has the same toll and generalized price
as in the first-best case in both demand states. It can achieve 80.4% of
the increase in social welfare.
3.2. Entry games
We will look at three entry regimes: free entry, entry by patronage
auction, and entry by generalized price auction. On both segments a
and b there will be some initial public capacity of 1500, so that we start
in round 0 with the base case. Thereafter, in each round, firms first
compete to add capacity to one section of the network, without
knowing the demand function that will be realized. After the demand
function becomes known, all firms decide on the tolls to charge. Then a
new round begins and there is again demand uncertainty. In this way,
we study the evolution of the addition of capacity by firms over time,
which mimics the slow and adaptive process of the expansion of road
capacity. Firms will always choose to enter on the segment with the
lower capacity, as this is more profitable. Fig. 1 shows how the network
looks after 5 rounds of entry.
We will compare the entry regimes with the second-best zero-best
profit case and with the base case, in terms of capacity, generalized
price, and welfare. Each entry game starts at the base case, and hence
does at least as well. The best we can hope for in terms of welfare from a
competitive case is the second-best zero-profit outcome, as entering
firms cannot make an expected loss and there will remain some un-
priced public capacity.
For simplicity, we assume that within each round, firms are forward
looking and rational, so the capacity decision takes into account the
equilibrium toll setting in the next stage. But between rounds, firms are
assumed myopic, in the sense that they take every round as being the
last, until they are “surprised” by newcomers who change the network
structure. We make these assumptions to avoid unsolvable dynamic
games, and we think they may also represent the slow and lump-sum
development in infrastructure in real life, because it usually takes
considerable time for new roads to materialize, a firm can focus on
competing with the existing firms for now and not worry too much
about possible new competitors in the future. But we admit this is a
simplification. In general, as also found by Van den Berg and Verhoef
(2012), if firms can anticipate new entries, they will set larger capa-
cities to limit or preempt the entry.
Another assumption is that when the uncertainty is assumed to be
resolved after completing a investment, there is again uncertain de-
mand in a new round. The replication of the same type of uncertainty
when every round begins is of course unrealistic, but helpful in our
setting, in that it avoids making ad hoc assumptions on how the un-
certainty itself evolves over time. In addition, this setting would
truthfully represent the case of peak-load pricing, when the demand
fluctuates regularly within a period in which capacity is fixed.
3.2.1. Free entry
In the free entry regime, the firm with the highest expected profit
sets some capacity on the segment of its choice. Then the demand un-
certainty is resolved, and firms set their tolls simultaneously. We allow
both old and new firms to add capacity. But, just as in Verhoef (2008), if
a firm already has some capacity on one segment but not on the other, it
will always have a higher gain from entering than existing firms on that
segment or firms that have no capacity at all. Therefore, our assumption
means that this firm will enter. So there are no problems with double
marginalization, in the sense that one may expect firms to be active on
both serial segments, and competition between such firms on parallel
segments to drive down tolls.
Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the capacities round by round. We
start in round 0 with the initial base case capacities. We may assume,
without loss of generality, that capacity is first added on section a. In
equilibrium, the firm that has added capacity on section a will, in the
next round, add capacity on section b. Then a new firm adds capacity on
section a, then this same firm will add on section b, and so on. This
pattern emerges because (1) the same firm can better coordinate the
tolls on both sections, so it is the same firm rather than a new one which
will invest on a serial segment in the even round; (2) when the capacity
on one section is expanded, it is more profitable to add capacity on the
complementary section. In addition, the capacity addition in section b is
always larger than that in section a in the previous round, because of
the increased demand due to the capacity expansion on the other link. A
new firm always adds capacity in section a in the next round because if
an old firm does so, it will end up competing with its own capacities in
section a and gets a smaller profit gain than a new firm.
Capacity steadily increases with entry. But even after eight rounds,
the total capacity is well below that in the second-best zero-profit. As
Figs. 3 and 4 show, the welfare is also still well below that in the
second-best zero-profit case, and the generalized price is much higher.
Eight rounds of entry, and so four competing firms, probably is more
than we can expect in reality, so that clearly free entry leads to a
welfare loss and hurts consumers. The qualitative patterns match those
described in Verhoef (2008) and Van den Berg and Verhoef (2012) for
deterministic demand.
3.2.2. Entry by perfectly-competitive auctions
Now we turn to the two auction regimes. In the entry by patronage
auction regime, the firm which offers the highest expected traffic flow
on the new link is allowed to add the link. In the entry by generalized
price auction regime, the firm which offers the lowest expected gen-
eralized price can add the link. Every time a new firm enters, it makes
Fig. 1. The network after 5 rounds of entry.
Note: The origin and destination are connected by the
segments a and b, where each has a number of par-
allel roads. Initial capacities a0 and b0 will remain
unpriced. We assume that entry starts on segment a.
During each following entry, it is more profitable to
enter on the segment with the lower total capacity.
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Fig. 2. Development of the capacities of the two links over the entry rounds.
Fig. 3. The generalized price in each entry round.
Fig. 4. The Relative efficiency in each entry round.
Note: Relative efficiency is the expected welfare gain relative of a policy from the base case relative to the gain of the first-best social optimum.
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zero expected profit since the auction is perfectly competitive.
Afterwards, it keeps the toll scheme unchanged. It may not collect en-
ough tolls to cover the capacity cost if later too many firms enter with
low tolls. Again, there is no issue with double marginalization and
parallel competition remains: first firm 1 enters on segment a, then it
enters on segment b, then a new firm 2 enters on segment a, then this
same firm 2 enters on b, and so on and on.
Figs. 2–4 show that both auction entry regimes perform much better
than free entry: they lead to higher capacities, higher welfare, and
lower prices. The development is also much quicker. Already after 4
rounds on entry and 2 firms, the outcome is very similar to the second-
best zero-profit case. But due to the assumed sequential nature of entry,
capacity will eventually exceed the second-best zero-profit capacities
and generalized prices will be lower. This is actually also true with free
Fig. 5. Zoom of the relative efficiency over the entry rounds for the auction formats.
Note: Relative efficiency is the expected welfare gain of a policy from the base case relative to the gain of the first-best social optimum.
Fig. 6. Sensitivity analysis: Degree of uncertainty.
Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis: Demand elasticity.
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entry, but this takes a very long time, and it also occurs with de-
terministic demand in Verhoef (2008).
The two auction regimes perform rather similarly, and in the above
figures it is difficult or even impossible to distinguish the two. Yet, as
the zoomed in picture of the development of the relative efficiency in
Fig. 5 shows, a generalized price auction consistently performs better
than the patronage auction in this numerical model. Whether this is
generally true is impossible to say. The figure does clearly show that the
two auction formats lead to different results, which is certainly not the
case under deterministic demand.
3.3. Sensitivity Analysis
The numerical simulation seems to suggest that entry by either
auction performs better than free entry. In addition, entry by the gen-
eralized price auction seems to generate higher efficiency than the
patronage auction when demand is uncertain. In this section we test the
sensitivity of such results with respect to the degree of uncertainty and
the price elasticity of demand.
In the numerical simulation, the inverse demand function is re-
presented by =D N N( ) ·i i i i0 1 and the degree of uncertainty is re-
presented by a, where = + a(1 )h0 0 for the high demand state and
= a(1 )l0 0 for the low demand state. =a 0 means demand is cer-
tain, and as a increases, demand becomes more uncertain. =a 0.2 is
used in the main numerical simulation. Fig. 6 shows the relative effi-
ciency of the three regimes after five rounds of entry, for different de-
grees of demand uncertainty. For the range considered, the two auc-
tions clearly perform better than free entry, because capacity addition is
quicker with auctions. The efficiencies of the two auctions are close,
which is consistent with the case without demand uncertainty, where
they are equal. Yet, for sufficiently high uncertainty, the generalized
price auction clearly leads to a higher welfare than the patronage
auction. As the degree of uncertainty increases, the relative efficiency of
all three regulatory regimes increases. The main reason is that the op-
timal capacity increases with the degree of uncertainty, as was also
theoretically found for the first-best case.
To study the robustness of the results with respect to demand
elasticity, we vary the demand elasticity by changing the intercept and
slope of the inverse demand function, keeping the base equilibrium
unchanged. For the main simulation in the previous section, the de-
mand elasticity was 0.50. Fig. 7 shows the relative efficiencies over
different elasticities. For the parameter range in the simulation, it seems
that the two auctions generate similar social welfare, with the gen-
eralized price auction performing only slightly better. They both per-
form much better than free entry, due to their quick addition of capa-
city. As the demand becomes less elastic, due to larger capacity
adjustment under the first-best case and the auctions, the expected
social welfare of the three cases increases less significantly than that of
the base equilibrium and the free-entry case. As a result, the relative
efficiency of the auctions decreases and that of the free-entry case in-
creases.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated how demand uncertainty influences the
efficiency of the private supply of roads in a mixed privatepublic road
network. We have compared different benchmarks and evaluated the
efficiency of regulatory policies for both simple static networks and
more complex dynamic ones.
Demand uncertainty indeed raises new challenges for policy ma-
kers. For simple networks, taking demand uncertainty into considera-
tion, the optimal capacity for the first-best case is larger than its de-
terministic counterpart. In the second-best zero-profit case, the tolls for
serial links are no longer Pigouvian. The patronage and the generalized
price auction can no longer achieve the second-best zero-profit result.
For more complex networks with dynamic formation of new links, if the
firms with the highest expected profits can add capacity in turn, there is
usually over-investment. When we control the process by the patronage
auction or the generalized price auction, the expected social welfare
increases much more quickly and comes rather close to a steady state
after only five rounds. Unlike in the case of deterministic demand, with
demand uncertainty the generalized price auction performs better than
the patronage auction.
Our findings can be useful for policy makers and practitioners who
have to make decisions about road pricing and capacity investment
despite prevailing demand uncertainty. For a Pigouvian toll to correct
the externality in many markets such as the transport, tele-
communications, and energy markets, caution needs to be exercised
because demand uncertainty will render some policies less effective in
mixed networks. In addition, market competition itself may not be
enough to guarantee a quick formation of efficient road networks.
Instead, combining the forces of market competition with regulation,
especially the generalized price auction, is proven in theory to be a
reliable way of providing good public service by private firms. It can
form the basis for public–private joint projects in more complex and
realistic settings.
In sum, demand uncertainty complicates the evaluation and reg-
ulation of the private supply of roads in mixed networks, but clearly in
reality there is uncertainty. For future research, we will consider more
general networks, dynamic games of capacity addition, user hetero-
geneity, and optimal auction design.
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